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CASE NOTES
ADMIRALTY-EXCULPATORY CLAUSE IN TOWAGE
CONTRACT HELD INVALID AS AGAINST
PUBLIC POLICY
The Cairo,a steam towboat, pulled the oil barge Bisso up the Mississippi
River. The barge was without any officers, crew, steering apparatus, or
power of its own. The Cairo furnished the motive power and controlled
the barge's movements. While so engaged, the barge struck a bridge
pier and sank. The respondent disclaimed liability for any negligence because the contract of towage called for the tow to be at the "sole risk"
of the barge owners, providing also that masters, crews, and employees of
the Cairo should "in the performance of said service, become and be
the servants" of the petitioner's barge Bisso. The district court found that
the respondents were negligent in the management of the tow, but that2
these clauses relieved them from liability.' The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exculpatory clause in the
towage contract could not relieve the liability of the respondent for his
negligence. Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corporation, 349 U.S. 85 (1955).
There is no express constitutional or statutory provision relating to exculpatory clauses in maritime contracts. The Court drew upon its constitutional powers in matters maritime to decide the case. 3 Prior decisions
and public policy considerations are the basis for the holding.
The first question decided was that a towboat owner could not, by
contract, relieve himself of liability for his negligence in towing another
vessel which was without crew or power. The Court based this holding
on public policy held to have been enunciated in earlier decisions, concerning tugs and tows. The Steamer Syracuse was cited as having set
forth this rule.4 That Court, in a very brief statement, held that the law
had not imposed on the tug owner the liability of a common carrier, but
that a tug owner would have to exercise "reasonable care, caution, and
maritime skill." If such is not exercised the tower must be liable for the
results. "It is unnecessary to consider the evidence relating to the alleged
contract of towage ... [because even if] the canal boat was being towed

at her own risk, nevertheless, the steamer is liable"5 if the tower's negligence caused the loss.
1 114 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. La., 1953).
2211 F. 2d 401 (C.A. 5th, 1954).
3

U.S. Const. Art. 3, §2.

479 U.S. 167 (1870).

5 Ibid., at 171.
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This represents in substance the Court's only comments on the question. The opinion is concerned mainly with whether the Syracuse was
navigated with reasonable skill and care. The defense attempted to show
that reasonable care had been exercised. The Court itself does not suggest
that it is setting forth public policy barring agreements by which a
private carrier may relieve itself from liability. Two years later in New
York Central R. Co. v. Lockwood,6 the same Court decided that such
agreements were not valid for common carriers. Eighteen years later a
similar rule for common carriers by water was adopted. 7 Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in his dissent in the instant case points out:
Surely this Court [The Syracuse] did not impliedly, in a moment of absent
mindedness, declare such a rule in the case of a private carrier and two years
later require 25 pages to justify it in the case of common carriers.8
The majority of the Court in the instant case declared that The Syracuse was decided in an era which was hostile to release from negligence
clauses. It is not evident, however, why the Supreme Court would go
to the length of writing an involved opinion justifying its decision as to
common carriers, protecting the passenger public at large when it required barely one hundred and fifty words to establish such a policy as
to private carriers two years before. Further, the hostility toward such
clauses occurred generally where there was great inequality of bargaining
power; i.e., the average train passenger as to the railroad company. In
the case of tug versus tow such inequality has not been shown. Regardless, most courts accepted the doctrine, and later cited The Syracuse as
having established it.
Prior to The Syracuse two New York courts held that tug owners were
not common carriers and that, therefore, they might perhaps limit their
liability by special agreement. 9 Alexander v. Greene was appealed and
reversed. 10 The tug was held liable for its negligence, apparently as a negligent common carrier. The case of Wells & Tucker v. The Steam Navigation Co." on appeal somewhat later, held that tug owners were not
common carriers, but that a tug could not by a contractual clause providing that towing be done "at the risk of the master and owner thereof"
escape liability for their negligence. The court stated that such a provision
would certainly have to be put more clearly, and that the parties evidently
684 U.S. 357 (1873).
7Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Insurance Co., 129 U.S. 397

(1889).
8 Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 103 (1955).
9 Wells & Tucker v. the Steam Navigation Co., 2 Comst. (N.Y.) 204 (1849); Alexander v. Greene, 3 Hill (N.Y.) 9 (1842).
107 Hill (N.Y.) 533 (1844).
118 N.Y. 375 (185j).
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had in mind those disasters which might occur without the tug's negligence. This is slightly contradictory because if tugs are not common
carriers they are liable only for their own negligence and wilful misconduct. Thus, the contractual clause would be meaningless. The court,
however, did not state that a release from negligence clause could not,
even if properly drawn, be given that effect. This court cited the second
Alexander case with approval.
In 1850 in The Vanderslice v. The Superior,12 a federal district court
held that a tug owner could not avoid liability for his own negligence
though the tow was to be at the risk of the tow owner. In this case the
weather was such as to make the voyage hazardous. The tug captain set
out after it was agreed that the tow was to be at its own risk. The tug

through poor seamanship and negligence injured the tow and sought to
avoid liability on the strength of this agreement. The court in a dictum
thought it advisable that tugs be considered common carriers, and held the
tug liable for its negligence in spite of the agreement. The Princeton," in
1851, held that owners of towing vessels were not liable as common carriers citing the first Wells case, and indicating that a tug owner might be
able to limit his liability by contract. On appeal in 1853, the court stated
that "an agreement to be towed 'at the risk of the master and owners' of
the tow, does not exempt the tug from proper and reasonable care and skill
in her navigation."' 14 The court held that the evidence did not show that
the Princeton was definitely negligent, and therefore, did not go further
with the question, nor was reference made to other cases. It was, then, in
this climate of judicial opinion that The Syracuse was decided, coming
forth with its rule, representing a crystallization of the rules and trends
shown by these earlier cases. None of these earlier cases including The
Syracuse, purported to be stating public policy. In fact, some thought of
tugs as common carriers and liable therefore, unless the very highest degree of care was exercised. The rest seemed simply to consider it wrong
for a tug to escape liability for its negligence with no real basis given in
law for this result. In any event, The Syracuse opinion of 1870 cited none
of the prior decisions in similar circumstances.
After The Syracuse, the Supreme Court in The Margaret15 held that although a tug is not a common carrier, it is bound to exercise reasonable
skill and care in towing. There was no question of an exculpatory clause
here. In 1878 the court in Ulrich v. The Sunbea,n 6 held that it is settled
that a tug owner is not a common carrier, but that it is against public
12 28

Fed. Cas. 970, No. 16,843 (E.D. Pa., 1850).

19 Fed. Cas. 1342, No. 11,433a (S.D. N.Y., 1851).
14 19 Fed. Cas. 1344, 1345, No. 11,434 (C.C. N.Y., 1853).
1594 U.S. 494 (1876).
13

16 24 Fed. Cas. 515, No. 14,329 (D.C. N.J., 1878).
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policy to allow a tug owner to escape liability for his negligence by the
expedient of a towage contract provision. This court did not cite The
8 and
Syracuse at all. In The Jonty Jenks17 the court cited The Princeton1
9
Langley v. The Syracuse' and stated that it is not necesary to consider
whether or not the towage was to be at the sole risk of the tow because
such agreements are not valid as exempting the tug from the duty to use
reasonable care.
Then in the Second Circuit in 1909, The Syracuse was repudiated in
The Oceanica.20 A tug, the court stated, is liable only for the results of
its negligence, so that contract clauses to assume all risks or at the sole
risk as in The Syracuse would be meaningless unless they were understood to include negligence. The court, apparently did not mean to
suggest that a tug owner would not be liable for intentional wrongs, but
this was not mentioned in the opinion. However, the court decided to
give the contract effect and allow the tow company to avoid liability for
its negligence. This court hoped that the question would be set at rest
by the Supreme Court, but certiorari was denied. 21 The court in The
Oceanica felt that it was not against public policy to allow a tug to escape
liability through an exculpatory clause. The court did not go against
any express opinions to the contrary except for the lower court holding
in The Sunbeam. 22 Courts in the Second Circuit have followed The
23
Oceanica since.

In Compaffia de Navegacion Interior, S.A. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co.
(The Wash Gray) 24 the Supreme Court of the United States again considered the question. In this case, a tug owner insured his small tug with defendant insurance company; the tug was lost at sea while being towed. The
insurance company denied liability on the policy for the reason that the
plaintiff had entered into a contract with the tug relieving the tug from
liability for its negligence. The insurance company claimed that this contract was valid, and that therefore the insured had bargained away the insurance company's subrogation rights, thus releasing them by provision
in the insurance agreement of any obligation to pay on the policy.
This contract stated that the tower "is not responsible in any way for
loss or damage to the Wash Gray. ' 25 The Court then quoted the first para54 Fed. 1021 (N.D. N.Y., 1893).
1819 Fed. Cas 1344, No. 11, 434 (C.C. N.Y., 1853).
17

19 14 Fed. Cas. 1115, No. 8068 (S.D. N.Y., 1867).

170 Fed. 893 (C.A. 2d, 1909).
21215 U.S. 599 (1909).
22 24 Fed. Cas. 515, No. 14329 (D.C. N.J., 1878).
23 Ten Eyck v. Director General of Railroads, 267 Fed. 974 (C.A. 2d, 1920); The
Melvin and Mary, 23 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. N.Y., 1938); The Mercer, 14 F. 2d 488 (E.D.
N.Y., 1926).
25
Ibid., at 73.
24 277 U.S. 66 (1928).
20
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graph of The Syracuse opinion with approval and held that the contract
here would not release the tower from liability for his negligence; and
that, therefore, the insurance company could not avoid liability on the
insurance policy on this ground. There were other considerations not
material here. The Court did not go into the matter beyond applying The
Syracuse opinion to this clause. The dispute was not, therefore, finally set
at rest as it might have been by a somewhat more definite statement or
reference to The Oceanica.
In the Sixth Circuit, the courts have construed clauses as not reaching
the negligence involved, and have avoided stating directly that a tug owner could not under any circumstances relieve himself of liability for his
own negligence. 26 The Ninth Circuit has indicated in several cases that it
preferred the rule of The Syracuse but it has not passed on a case squarely
in point.27 The instant case, then, should settle the question, and leave
no room for doubt.
The second question decided by the instant case stems from the first.
The court held as invalid provisions in towage contracts that tug company employees become the servants of the tow, thus relieving the tug
company of liability for their negligence. Such provisions were held to
be simply a method for the tug company to avoid liability for its own
negligence, an attempt to circumvent the principle rule of the case. Sun
Oil Company v. Dalzell Towing Company2s was cited as allowing such a
contractual provision as to pilots. An extension of this rule to include
crews, masters, and employees was sought and refused.
In the Sun Oil case respondent furnished a pilot and three tugs. Petitioner's ship was to proceed under her own power with assistance from the
tugs. The ship was damaged when run aground due to the pilot's negligence. There was a clause in the pilotage contract which stated that the
pilot was to be servant of the petitioner while engaged in piloting the
petitioner's vessel, and that, therefore, the tug owners were not liable. The
Court found for the respondent on this ground. The instant case is readily
distinguishable from this case in that the master, crew, and employees of
the Cairo were to become and be, in the performance of such towage, the
servants of the Bisso, while the Sun Oil case refers only to pilots. Further,
in the Sun Oil case, the petitioner's ship was proceeding under her own
power with some assistance from the tug as opposed to the situation in the
instant case where the tug was engaged in towing a vessel without crew
26Walter G. Hougland, Inc. v. Muscovalley, 184 F. 2d 530 (C.A. 6th, 1950); Great
Lakes Towing Co. v. American S.S. Co., 165 F. 2d 368 (C.A. 6th, 1948); Great Lakes

Towing Co. v. Bethlehem Transportation Corp., 65 F. 2d 543 (C.A. 6th, 1933).
27 British Columbia Mills Tug and Barge Co. v. Mylroie, 259 U.S. 1 (1922); Alaska
Commercial Co. v. Williams, 128 Fed. 362 (C.A. 9th, 1904). See Hall-Scott Motor Car
Co. v. Universal Insurance Co., 122 F. 2d 531 (C.A. 9th, 1941).
28 287 U.S. 291 (1932).
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or power of its own. This extension of the rule of the Sun Oil case was
29
not allowed.
The rule against contractual exemption of a tow boat from responsibility for
its own negligence cannot be defeated by the simple expedient of providing in
a contract that all employees of a towboat shall be 30
employees of the towed vessel
when the latter "employment" is purely a fiction.

Then in Boston Metals Co. v. SIS Winding Gulf,3 ' decided the same
day as the instant case, the Supreme Court held that it was error to impute the negligence of the towboat company's employees to the tow, because exculpatory clauses are not valid. In that case, the owners of an obsolete destroyer brought a suit in admiralty against the owners of a steam
vessel, the Winding Gulf, to recover for the loss of their destroyer which
sank after a collision with the Winding Gulf. The destroyer, which was
without crew or power of its own, was being towed by the tug Peter
Moran. The owners of the Winding Gulf filed a cross libel against petitioner on the grounds that the collision was caused by the unseaworthiness
of the destroyer. The district court found that the collision was due to the
fact that the destroyer was inadequately lighted because the tug had not
put a crew on board the destroyer to maintain such lighting. 32 In addition,
the Winding Gulf was found to have been negligent in navigationa This
court imputed negligence of the tug to the petitioner on the basis of the
towage contract which provided that the tug's master and crew would become the servants of the petitioner and the circuit court affirmed. 4 The
Supreme Court, however, as noted previously, reversed this holding allowing petitioner to recover without division of damages.
In a third case decided with the instant case the court did not allow
the tug company to gain affirmative relief on the basis of a pilotage release from negligence clause.3 5 Petitioner's employee, a pilot, went aboard
the Christopher Gale, to assist in moving the ship from a Hoboken pier
to a Brooklyn pier. Two of petitioner's tugs were to assist, but the Christopher Gale was to move for the most part under her own power. During
this operation, one of the tugs was crushed against a pier and it was for
damage to this tug that petitioner sought recovery. The district court
found that the collision occurred because of the negligence of the pilot
29 See Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 93, 94 for a discussion of the
pilots' unique position in the maritime world.
80 Ibid., at 95.

31349 U.S. 122 (1955).
32 Boston Iron and Metal Co. v. S.S. Winding Gulf, 85 F. Supp. 806 (D.C. Md.,
1949); The St. Francis, 72 F. Supp. 50 (D.C. Md., 1947).
3 In admiralty, under maritime law, contributory negligence is used mainly as a
basis for division of damages. 54 A.L.R. 238, 239 (1928).
34 Boston Metals Co. v. S.S. Winding Gulf, 209 F. 2d 410 (C.A. 4th, 1954).
35 United States v. Nielson, 349 U.S. 129 (1955).
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in not heeding the effect of wind and tide on the Christopher Gale.30
Petitioner asserted that the pilot, their own employee, was the servant of
the respondents and that they, by virtue of the pilotage contract, were not
responsible for his negligence, and further, that they were entitled to
affirmative relief in that the pilot was acting as the servant of the respondent. The district court denied recovery. The circuit court affirmed. 3 7 The
Supreme Court held that the petitioner would not be responsible for the
negligence of the pilot (giving effect to a pilotage release from liability
for negligence clause) in any damage to respondent's ship, but that the
tow company could not obtain affirmative relief for damage to their own
ship caused by their pilot's negligence. The Supreme Court, however,
hints that perhaps, with proper contractual language, such liability might
attach.
The decision in the instant case sets the law at rest, stating definitely
that a tug, whether acting as a common or contract carrier, cannot by
contract escape libility for its negligence. The Bisso case combined
with the Boston Metals case indicates that the Court will not allow this
rule to be circumvented. The exception in favor of pilotage contracts is
recognized in the Bisso, the Boston Metals and the Nielson cases, the last
named case denying affirmative relief on the basis of such a contract.
Thus, there would seem to be little room for question left in this area.
There will be little chance for a change unless, perhaps, it could be shown
authoritatively that such rules work a hardship on tug companies, that
they are less able to carry the risk of loss than the shippers, that, in short,
the rules are outmoded.
36The Dauntless No. 6, 112 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. N.Y., 1953).
37

United States v. Nielson, 209 F. 2d 958 (C.A. 2d. 1954).

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRES
ENFORCEMENT OF INVALID SEPARATION
AGREEMENT TO PREVENT UNJUST
ENRICHMENT
Plaintiff, nearly twenty years before bringing suit, entered into a separation agreement with his wife at a time when they were living separately. Plaintiff and wife were Illinois residents. By the agreement the
wife in consideration of $2,000 paid waived her rights in any property
which plaintiff then owned or should later acquire. Plaintiff, by the agreement, waived his rights to property which his wife owned or should later
acquire. By another clause, the wife waived her rights to support by plaintiff. A series of Illinois decisions' has held separation agreements invalid
1 Lagow v. Snapp, 400 Ill. 414, 81 N.E. 2d 144 (1948); Berge v.. Berge, 366 IMI.228.

